

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SANA 01101 041432Z

46

ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 EUR-12 SS-15 NSC-05 SP-02 INR-07

CIAE-00 SAM-01 /059 W

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R 031300Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY SANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7732

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T SANA 1101

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OTRA

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL VISIT OF SOMALI PRESIDENT TO YAR

SUMMARY. SOMALI PRESIDENT SIAD HAS VISITED YEMEN UNEXPECTEDLY IN EFFORT TO GENERATE SUPPORT FOR SOMALI SCENARIO FOR TAFI AND ALSO, POSSIBLY, TO PROBS OR ENCOURAGE YEMENIS RE THEIR SOVIET TIES. YEMENI RECEPTION WAS CORRECT BUT COLD AND GAVE SOMALIS ALMOST NO SATISFACTION ON SUBSTANCE.

1. LAST WEEK SOMALI PRESIDENT SIAD BARRE UNEXPECTEDLY ACCEPTED INVITATION TO VISIT YAR AND DULY ARRIVED ON MARCH 28, FOR SHORT TWO DAY VISIT. SOME YEMENIS, POINTING OUT THAT INVITATION WAS TWO YEARS OLD AND ALMOST FORGOTTEN IN FOREIGN MINISTRY, SPECULATE THAT ITS ACCEPTANCE NOW, THROUGH YEMENI AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, AFTER SIAD WOULD UP A MONTH LONG STAY IN USSR, MANS SAID WAS ASKED BYTHE SOVIETS TO PROBE YEMENI

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SANA 01101 041432Z

ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL

ORIENTATION OF YAR. THESE YEMENIS BELIEVE THAT IT IS PLAUSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HOPE SAID, A FIGURE WHOSE SOVIET TIES HAVE PREUMABLY STRENGTHENED HIM DOMESTICALLY AND PROJECTED HIM ON TO WORLD STAGE, COULD SERVE TO ENCOURAGE HAMDI NOT TO TURN TOO FAR OR TOO FAST TOWARD THE WEST AND THE SAUDISM USUALLY, IN THIS ANALYSIS, SIAD VISIT, COMING JUST BEFORE THE SAUDI PRINCE SULTAN VISIT, IS TERMED ANOTHER SOVIET SPOILING TACTIC, LIKE THE DELIVERIES A WEEK AGO OF MORE SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLIES. THERE WERE TWO SOVIET SHIPS IN HODEIDA ON MARCH 26-28, OFFLOADING SOME SMALL WHEELED TRANSPORT VEHICLES AND SPARES -- ALL QUITE ORDINARY EQUIPMENT.)

3. THEORY OF SOVIET INSPIRATION OF SIAD VISIT IS PLAUSIBLE BUT WE HAVE NO REPORTS THAT YAR SOVIET RELATIONS (MUCH LESS YAR-SAUDI RELATIONS) WERE ACTUALLY DISCUSSED. LIKEWISE, WE HAVE NO RPT NO EVIDENCE THAT SIAD CARRIED EVEN FORMAL MESSAGE FROM SOVIETS TO YEMENIS. HE DID PRAISE SOVIET AID TO ARAB AND THIRD WORLD BUT FONMIN ASNAG SAID THAT YARG RECEPTION WAS VERY FORMAL AND CORRECT, AND FOCUSSED ON TFAI. YEMENIS HEWED TO ARAB LEAGUE LINE, WHICH CALLS FOR REFERENDUM AND SELF-DETERMINATION (BUT DOES NOT MENTION INDEPENDENCE OR ANY OTHER FUTURE STATUS FOR TERRITORY). YEMENIS WOULD NOT GO BEYOND SUCH VAGUE FORMULATIONS IN TALKS WITH SOMALIS, AND COMUNIQUE (SEPTTEL) ISSUED AT END OF VISIT MENTIONS ONLY "THE NEED FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE SOMALI COAST TO EXERCISE ITS RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION." WE HAVE TWO REPORTS THAT SIAD SPECIFICALLY SOUGHT SUPPORT OF YAR FOR A TFAI "LIBERATION FRONT" WHICH IS TO BE FORMED, AND ASNAG SAID THE SOMALIS TRIED TO INCLUDE IN OFFICIAL DELEGATION TWO TFAI EXILE FIGURES. ASNAG SAID YARG REJECTED LATTER OUT OF HAND, INSISTING DELEGATION CONSIST ENTIRELY OF SOMALI OFFICIALS, AND ALL OTHER REPORTS AGREE THAT YARG SHOWED NO MORE WILLINGNESS TO GIVE PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO TFAI "LIBERATION" GROUP THAN TO ANY OTHER WHICH  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SANA 01101 041432Z

OCCASIONALLY SEEKS SUPPORT HERE -- MOST NOTABLY THE ELF. (EVEN PLO FINDS IT TOUGH TO OPERATE IN SANA, AND MORE RADICAL PALESTINIAN GROUPS CAN'T GET IN AT ALL.) HOWEVER, COMMUNIQUE DOES VAGUELY PLEDGE SUPPORT FOR "ALL AFRICAN LIBERATION GROUPS" A FORMULATION THAT EXTENDS FIRM YAR SUPPORT -- AND PRESUMABLY EMBARRASSED SOMALI SUPPORT -- TO BOTH RPT BOTH SIDES OF DISPUTES IN SAHARA, ANGOLA, TFAI

AND ELSEWHERE. (AMBIVALENCE IS A WELL-DEVELOPED YEMENI POLITICAL WEAPON.)

4. AMBIVALENCE ALSO MEANS, WE SUPPOSE, THAT YARG DID NOT PUSH WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE ITS REAL VIEWS ON SITUATION IN HORN YEMENIS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO US AND OTHER WESTERN EMBASSIES HERE -- NOTABLY THE FRENCH -- THAT THEY STRONGLY PREFER INDEPENDENCE OF TFAI, AND WOULD EVEN PREFER A RESIDUAL FRENCH MILITARY ROLE. THEY HAVE EXPRESSED TO US ON NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THEIR ANXIETY ABOUT WAXING SOVIET MILITARY POWER, PARTICULARLY IN CONTEST OF SIGNS OF "DISINTEGRATION" AND LEFTISTS TRENDS IN ETHIOPIA. DAY OF SIAD DEPARTURE, YARG CHIEF OF PROTOCOL, WHO CLOSE TO ASNAG AND PARTICIPATED IN MANY OF TALKS WITH SOMALIS, TOLD DCM HE LINKED OUTCOME IN TFAI TO U.S. ARMS AID TO ETHIOPIA. PRAISING THAT AID, HE CALLED ON U.S. TO CONTINUE AND INCREASE IN.

5. IN THIS AS IN OTHER REGIONAL SECURITY MATTERS, YARG IS COMPLETELY UNWILLING TO GET OUT IN FRONT OF OTHER ARABS AND EXPOSE ITSELF TO CRITICISM OR ATTACK IN A UNDIVIDED ARAB WORLD.

6. SOMALIS PROVED EQUALLY UNBUDGING IN DISCUSSING THE YEMENIS' COMMUNITY IN SOMALIA. THEY FLATLY REFUSED TO ALLOW YEMENI SCHOOLS TO REOPEN OR COMPENSATION TO BE PAID TO YEMENIS WHOSE PROPERTY HAS BEEN NATIONALIZED. IN CONNECTION WITH MUSLIM SHAYKHS WHO WERE RECENTLY EXECUTED, SOMALIS NOTED THAT ISLAM IS SOCIALISM AND EVERYONE IN SOMALIA - SEEMS TO UNDERSTAND THIS -- NOW. YEMENIS WERE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SANA 01101 041432Z

BADLY PUT OFF, AND INTEND PARA THREE OF THE COMMUNIQUE TO EXPRESS THEIR RESERVATIONS. PARA THREE "CALLS FOR THE RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS, RETURN OF ALL EXPELLED CITIZENS AND CREATION OF AN ATMOSPHERE ENABLING CITIZENS TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS FREELY AND DEMOCRATICALLY."

7. OVERALL, THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE WAS BRIEF AND COLD, AND IN OTHER PUBLIC MATTERS-- LIKE BANQUETS WITH NO SPEECHES OF PRAISE FOR SIAD OR YEMENI SOMALI RELATIONSHIPS -- LOCAL OBSERVERS GATHERED IMPRESSION THAT SOMALIS ACHIEVED VERY FEW OF THEIR GOALS WHILE IN SANA.  
SCOTES

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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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**TAGS:** OTRA, OVIP, PFOR, SO, YE, FT, UR, (SIAD BARRE, MOHAMED)  
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